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Energy Diplomacy: West Germany, the Soviet Union 
and the Oil Crises of the 1970s 
Frank Bösch ∗ 
Abstract: »Energiediplomatie. Westdeutschland, die Sowjetunion und die Ölkri-
sen der 1970er Jahre«. This article analyzes West German energy policy and ne-
gotiations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Archival sources from 
the West German government show that long-term energy diplomacy became 
a carefully built link which guaranteed cooperation even during political crises, 
such as the one in 1980/81. This article argues that energy diplomacy catalyzed 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik. In particular, natural gas pipelines implied mutual trust 
within a stable relationship, which led to further collaborations, including co-
operation in nuclear power. It points out that, from this perspective, 1973 was 
not exactly a turning point, and some grandiose plans in the years after the 
first oil crisis failed. Furthermore the article shows how the second oil crisis in 
1979 increased cooperation cooperation between West Germany and the Soviet 
Union, although this strained West Germany’s relationship with the United 
States. Archival documents reveal that energy policy matters remained well-
calculated and persistent. Thus, the Soviet Union became a more reliable part-
ner than many Arab countries. 
Keywords: Germany, Soviet Union, Cold War, oil crisis, natural gas, nuclear 
power, détente. 
1.  Introduction 
With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the NATO Double-Track Decision, 
and, shortly after, the crisis in Poland, the year 1980 marked the beginning of 
another frigid period of the Cold War. America’s reaction – i.e., imposing an 
embargo and boycotting the Moscow Olympics – is still in our memory. Yet, 
only a few weeks after the Soviet invasion, German businessmen traveled to 
Moscow to negotiate the biggest energy trade deal ever made between a West-
ern state and the Soviet Union. Even in these precarious times, Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt supported the continuation of said negotiations, telling the 
businessmen, “The usual business with the Soviet Union needs to continue, but 
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it should not be business as usual.”1 Schmidt thus agreed that the Federal Re-
public of Germany (FRG) could not afford to get rid of its Soviet energy sup-
plies and regarded joint energy policy making as a chance to restrain the Soviet 
Union. Thus, Schmidt stressed the need to aid the Soviet Union in “tapping the 
energy resources of their own territories, in order to curtail their appetite for 
foreign ones,”2 and further made clear in his remarks to President Carter that 
“those engaging in trade with each other do not shoot at one another.”3  
Two aspects of this constellation are particularly striking. First, the West 
German government evidently considered energy trading to be more significant 
than the ongoing political conflict. In fact, the issue of energy proved so power-
ful that West Germany chose to risk a massive conflict with its most important 
ally, the United States. Second, energy trading appears to have been politically 
strategic, including aims to involve the Soviet Union and Comecon States, and 
to secure peace. Both aspects provide good reasons for associating the trans-
formation of energy supplies with the history of the Cold War and the changing 
relationship between the East and the West.  
Usually, the decade of the oil crisis is associated with the growing power of 
the Arab world and OPEC. Numerous studies deal with their economic and 
political impacts on the Western world.4 Other publications have analyzed 
domestic efforts to reduce oil consumption in Western countries, cooperative 
attempts at meeting this challenge, and the quest for domestic energy resources. 
Since most of these publications were written by American and British schol-
ars, they tend to focus on their respective national perspectives and trading 
partners in the energy market, but seldom do they deal with countries such as 
Germany.5 Eastern Europe, especially, has been rarely considered from this 
historical angle, mainly because energy trading between the Communist East 
and the United States and Britain was practically nonexistent.6 Yet, starting in 
this decade, the Soviet Union became the largest energy producer in the world, 
delivering oil, gas, coal, and enriched uranium not only to its Eastern allies, but 
                                                             
1  “Das normale Geschäft mit der Sowjetunion solle weitergehen, aber es dürfe kein business 
as usual sein“; Gespräch Schmidt mit Wirtschaftsvertretern 30.1.1980, in Akten zur Auswär-
tigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ADAP), 1980, vol. 1, ed. Ilse Dorothee Pautsch 
et al. (München: Oldenbourg, 2011), 206. Also see report Sieger/documentation von Staden 
25.2.1980, in ibid., 91, note 19. 
2  “[A]uf ihrem eigenem Territorium Energiequellen zu erschließen, damit ihr Appetit auf 
fremde gezügelt wird”, meeting between Chancellor Schmidt, union leaders and corporate 
leaders 24.1.1980, in Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie Deutschlands (AdSD) 1/HSAA008881 
and identical: “Schmidt and economic leaders 30.1.1980“, in ADAP 1980, vol. 1, 206.  
3  “Wer Handel miteinander treibe, schieße nicht aufeinander”; minutes of meeting between 
Schmidt and Carter 5.3.1980, in ADAP 1980, vol. 1, 406. 
4  Compare e.g. Yergin 1991; Vernon 1976; Venn 2002. 
5  Only one study on Germany exists so far, which is based on press coverage from this time; 
Hohensee 1996. Forthcoming, but not on relations with Eastern Europe: Graf 2014. 
6  An early important exception: Gustafson 1989. 
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also increasingly to Central European countries. Especially during the energy 
crises of the 1970s, the Soviet Union emerged as a major player in the global 
competition for future energy supplies.7 Far from suffering a collapse in 1973, 
increasing trade with the West went hand-in-hand with economic growth in the 
Soviet Union. Although their energy exports never matched those of the Arab 
world, their political significance was overriding. Unsurprisingly, this led to 
interdependence during the Cold War, which also changed political and eco-
nomic systems in general. One might argue that, with their joint energy policy, 
Eastern and Western Europe affected more than their own relations. Their 
energy diplomacy also influenced relations between the socialist Comecon 
states, such as the Soviet Union and the GDR, and among the allied members 
of NATO (e.g., between the United States and West Germany).  
This article analyzes the interaction between Eastern and Western Europe 
before, during, and after the oil crises of the 1970s. It will examine to what 
extent the energy crises of 1973 and 1979 influenced European East-West 
relations and whether other developments were more influential. It discusses 
the scope and limits of energy policy making between the East and West, ex-
amining whether energy diplomacy and supply were able to cross the Iron 
Curtain over the course of the Cold War decades. While the article will briefly 
look at other countries, it will concentrate on the two most important trading 
partners: West Germany and the Soviet Union. As such, German archival 
sources, such as the papers of the Chancellors, the Foreign Minister, and the 
Economic Minister, are main sources.8  
The following analysis thus ties in with studies on “oil diplomacy,” a term 
that refers to the complex network of actors in the public and private sectors 
responsible for shaping inter-state relations.9 Since the 1970s, academics and 
politicians have repeatedly debated the extent to which multinational oil com-
panies influence foreign relations and state sovereignty. Although they reject 
the assumption that oil firms had maneuvered themselves into a position of 
political power, they believe that the companies’ involvement in the energy 
trade facilitated these increasing interdependencies.10 Even before the oil crisis, 
and especially after 1973, the energy supply was considered to have economic, 
military, political, and social relevance in questions of security.11  
                                                             
7  Cf. Perović 2013, 5-28; Victor and Victor 2006, 122-68.  
8  I have analyzed documents from the Chancellery, the Foreign Office, and the Ministry of 
Economics, as well as the papers of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who kindly granted me ac-
cess to his files.  
9  Cf. Venn 1986, 9. 
10  For information on the political and academic discourse on this subject since the 1970s cf. 
now Graf 2014.  
11  On contemporary discourse cf.: Miller 1977, 111-23 and Graf 2012, 185-208. 
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Since the 1980s, several political science studies have analyzed the former 
Soviet States’ energy policies, relying on public and official reports as sources.12 
A couple of historical studies have focused on the Soviet natural gas supply and 
its relevance for Ostpolitik, which helped to ease tensions between the socialist 
countries and West Germany under Chancellor Willy Brandt. Werner Lippert 
contends that long-term cooperation on the natural gas market enabled the 
lasting success of Ostpolitik.13 His study concentrates mainly on the diplomatic 
actions of a small number of statesmen in the early 1970s: Nixon/Kissinger, 
Brandt/Bahr, and Brezhnev. In 2013, Per Högselius published the most com-
prehensive and well-researched study on Russian natural gas exports to date, 
focusing mainly on contract negotiations up to the 1970s. He argues that eco-
nomic considerations regarding “red gas” have always been more important 
than political ones.14 Compared with these studies, my paper offers a broader 
perspective on the energy supply, including oil and nuclear power, while also 
providing a more focused look at the above issues.  
2.  1973 as a Caesura? Energy Diplomacy before the Crisis 
Research on the 1970s tends to mark the year 1973 as a watershed moment and 
the oil crisis, with its economic and cultural implications, as a nucleus of 
change.15 At the same time, several studies on energy and economic history 
have relativized its significance, for the term “energy crisis” had long been in 
use and special energy programs had been launched prior. Price increases and 
the perceived energy shortage were growing issues during these preceding 
years, and OPEC thus raised prices before 1973’s Arab-Israeli War; although, 
prices increased only after the war’s start.16  
There are good reasons to contend that the 1973 oil crisis was not actually a 
watershed event for Eastern Europe and energy relations between the East and 
West. The Soviet Union’s energy diplomacy, in particular, illustrates that the 
increase in oil prices, in connection with the Yom Kippur War, intensified 
plans that were already under way, rather than marking a crucial turning point. 
The late 1950s and, to an even greater extent, the late 1960s witnessed the 
initiation of such developments.  
The basic outline of these preliminary events is familiar. Although energy 
trade with Russia can be traced back to czarist times, such dealings came to a 
                                                             
12  For the most important study on German relations cf. Wörmann 1986. Comp. also: 
Smallidge 1997, 4-25. 
13  Lippert 2011, 182.  
14  Högselius 2013, 7, 222. 
15  Cf. e.g.: Borstelmann 2012, 54; Killen 2007; Raithel et al. 2009 and Jarausch 2008. 
16  Venn 2002, 8 and Yergin 1991, 590; Graf 2014. 
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temporary halt under Stalin in the 1930s. The United States and the Coordinat-
ing Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) undertook boycotts 
in the 1950s, which further prolonged this interruption.17 At the end of the 
decade, the USSR was finally able to gradually revive its trading routes. The 
Druzhba pipeline played a key role in fostering economic ties in the East by 
strengthening Soviet relations with allied socialist states of the Comecon. Also, 
many Western nations that had previously been clients of American companies 
were now getting their oil from the Soviet Union. While neutral countries such 
as Finland, Sweden, and Austria played crucial roles, NATO states, such as 
Greece and Italy, also purchased large quantities of oil.18 In addition, Western 
European companies, particularly those located in Italy, Austria, and West 
Germany, invested heavily in the construction of pipelines.19  
Political tensions such as the Berlin Crisis, the construction of the Berlin 
Wall, and the Cuban missile crisis notwithstanding, economic cooperation 
evolved between Eastern and Western Europe. For political security reasons, as 
well as economic interests, NATO enforced an embargo initiated by the United 
States in 1962, prohibiting the delivery of large-diameter pipes for a period of 
five years.20 Its effect during the 1960s was threefold. Firstly, since Western 
European countries grudgingly complied with this more stringent policy – and 
some even chose to undermine it – energy relations were causing tension 
among NATO members even prior to the oil crisis.21 West Germany in particu-
lar took a substantial hit and protested the fact that, now, only a fifth of the 
energy supplies agreed upon could be provided, which jeopardized trust be-
tween them and their Soviet trading partner.22 Secondly, it became apparent 
that the boycott attempts had little effect on an increasingly globalized econo-
my. Other countries such as Sweden and Japan understudied it, so that the 
completion of the Druzhba pipeline was hardly delayed. Thus, economic ra-
tionale increasingly took precedence over political goals. Thirdly, rather than 
withdrawing from foreign trade, the Soviet Union actively sought contact with 
the West in the second half of the 1960s, selling oil and gas to boost its econo-
my. Negotiations with Austria and Italy over a gas supply line to Trieste, a 
project that could only be realized with West German support and thus affected 
exports to Southern Germany as well, were already underway in 1966.23 Since 
gas from the Netherlands was more expensive, financial aspects were an im-
portant motivation for Western countries. However, the possibility of rap-
                                                             
17  Perović 2013, 12 and Fäßler 2006. 
18  Painter 2009, 505. 
19  Högselius 2013, 38-40. 
20  Wörmann 1986, 28. 
21  This is the central argument in Wörmann 1986, 29 and Lippert 2011, 9. 
22  Cf. notes dept. IIA 6 to the Bundespräsidialamt [Office of the Federal President] 19.1.1968, 
in PA AA B 41 51. 
23  Schliecker to the Ministry of Economics 12.12.1966, in: PA AA B 41 64. 
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prochement was seen as a welcome political side effect. For some politicians, 
such as Willy Brandt, it was even the other way round, and this link between 
economy and policy helped him in the long run to convince conservative and 
liberal politicians and the public.  
Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, which became a key issue when he was elected 
Chancellor in October 1969, undoubtedly played a significant role in promot-
ing energy policies. However, economic cooperation in the energy sector cer-
tainly preceded it – one might even say such cooperation laid the groundwork 
for Ostpolitik. As early as the summer of 1969, upon approval by the Ministry 
of Economics, West German businessmen negotiated the construction of a gas 
pipeline with the Soviet Union in Vienna. At this point, West Germany’s For-
eign Ministry had already justified getting twenty percent of its natural gas 
from the Soviet Union.24 It was significant that the conservative Bavarian Min-
istry of Economics took an active part in drawing up this first agreement to 
obtain Soviet gas – its landlocked location went hand-in-hand with high energy 
prices.25 In late 1969, two private law contracts were concluded: one stipulating 
that the Ruhrgas AG be supplied with 3 billion cubic meters of natural gas per 
annum over a twenty-year period, the other regulating 1.2 billion Deutschmarks 
worth of pipes, provided by Mannesmann AG and Thyssen Röhrenwerke AG, 
for the purpose of building a 2000-kilometer pipeline.26 The fact that the Ger-
mans successfully competed for Soviet energy supplies was resented not only 
by its Western European allies, but also by some German ministries, which 
believed that interest rates, runtime, and amortization were unusually generous 
and that the Federal Republic of Germany was taking advantage of its financial 
powers so as to dominate and establish trade with the East.27  
The most significant transaction between the East and the West up to this 
point had thus already been completed well before Brandt’s treaties with Mos-
cow took effect and can be seen as an integral part of the treaties. When the 
German Minister of Economic Affairs, Karl Schiller, and the Soviet Minister of 
Foreign Trade, Nicolas Patolitchev, solemnly shook hands after signing their 
contract in Essen on February 1, 1970, the agreement marked the prelude to 
Ostpolitik.28 In subsequent political negotiations, this contract served as proof 
of a new sense of unity for both parties, as well as a sign of “real Soviet interest 
to consolidate and broaden cooperative efforts.”29 The new pipeline tied the 
                                                             
24  Documentation Herbst 27.6.1969, in ADAP 1969, 741-2. 
25  Regarding Bavaria's energy policy, cf. Deutinger 2001, 66-72 and Högselius 2013, 67-70. 
26  AAPD 1969 II. 86, footnote 1. 
27  Cf. documentation undersecretary Herbst 26.1.1970, in AAPD 1969, vol. 1, 86 and Der 
Spiegel, February 9, 1970, 34. 
28  Minutes 3.2.1970 in AAPD 1970, vol. 1, 33. For its representation in the media cf. e.g.: Der 
Spiegel, February 9, 1970, 34. 
29  Cf. e.g. documentation Gehlhoff 11.2.1970, in ADAP 1970, vol 1., 220. Regarding its trade 
significance cf. Rudolph 2004, 274. 
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East and the West, ensuring an increase in export shares. When Brezhnev visit-
ed West Germany in May 1973, he regarded the pipeline as guarantor of long-
term partnership: “Once this has been completed, cooperation shall be secured 
for 30, even 50 years.”30 In reality, the Federal Republic of Germany began to 
emerge as the USSR’s primary Western trading partner as early as 1972. In that 
year, as well as in 1974, new contracts expanded the pipeline business, and by 
1973 oil exports to West Germany had tripled.31 At first glance the develop-
ment of trade with the Soviet Union, a country with a weak currency, resem-
bled “the trading practices of the Stone Age: clubs for bones, bones for furs, 
furs for stone axes,”32 as Krupp CEO Berthold Beitz archly concluded. Al-
though these were actually complex individual contracts involving major con-
sortia, they were ultimately bilateral trade agreements; revenue thus stagnated 
and ultimately failed to regain momentum.33  
Beyond the Federal Republic, various other East-West collaborations had at-
tended to the construction of natural gas pipelines around 1970. For instance, 
Finland supplied Scandinavia via a pipeline that had already been completed by 
1973, and which the Soviet Union hailed as a sure sign of cordial relations.34 
Even earlier, in 1966, the USSR proposed the construction of an 8000-
kilometer pipeline to Japan, which was to span the distance between Siberia 
and Nakhodka, which lies on the coast of the Japanese Sea. Both countries 
entered into serious negotiations in 1971/72. Soviet efforts to make Siberian 
resources accessible went even further.35  
West German documents also contain a myriad of information on initiatives 
that, until now, have lain buried in dust, including those suggested by regional 
politicians. For example, the Hessian Minister President, Albert Osswald, had 
establishing a gasoline refinery in Kassel in mind. He promoted this idea in 
Romania in 1971, suggesting that the oil pipelines between the Soviet Union 
and the GDR should be extended to Kassel. Sure enough, the small federal 
state of Hesse was soon in talks with the USSR over a petroleum pipeline from 
Schwedt (GDR) to where the new facility was to operate.36 Similarly, in late 
1972, the West Berlin Senate conducted negotiations to expand the refinery in 
Schwedt and supply the city with additional Soviet oil using West German 
                                                             
30  “Wenn dies einmal fertig sei, dann sei die Zusammenarbeit für 30, ja 50 Jahre garantiert” 
and documentation of talk between Brandt and Breschnev 18.5.1973, in ADAP 1973, vol. 2, 
721. 
31  Note by Sieger 6.11.1973, in PA AA B 41 51. 
32  “[D]em Tauschverkehr der Steinzeit: Keulen gegen Knochen, Knochen gegen Felle, Felle 
gegen Steinäxte”; Beitz acc. to Der Spiegel, January 23, 1978, 42. 
33  Also see Rudolph 2004, 354. 
34  Cf. the FRG consul's report from Leningrad to the AA 7.1.1974, in PA AA B 41 51. 
35  Reports by the German embassy in Tokyo to the AA 29.7.1971 and 20.12.1971, in PA AA B 
52 366 and Curtis 1977, 154-158.  
36  Proposal for talk, dept. 403 AA 26.10.1973, and note dept. III D 2 6.2.1973, in PA AA B 41 
51. 
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support. Although this project evoked memories of the 1948 Berlin Airlift, 
during which the allies had delivered coal supplies by air, the German Chancel-
lery ultimately consented.37 Even so, since the 1950s the GDR had been pro-
cessing crude oil for West Berlin. After 1969, processing intensified, and by 
the mid-1970s the market share of gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil made in the 
GDR reached 50 percent. In the process, crude oil was exchanged between and 
processed by the two German states.38 By 1980, just over half of West Berlin’s 
energy supplies were provided by the Federal Republic and a good third by the 
GDR, while Poland and the USSR contributed to a lesser extent.39 In this context, 
energy diplomacy between the East and the West was particularly consequential.  
It appears that, prior to the oil crisis of 1973, the Soviet Union was also a 
much-desired nuclear trading partner. Up until then, West Germany had re-
ceived enriched uranium from the United States. However, in 1972 the latter 
decided to impose stricter trading conditions for uranium supplies to Western 
Europe. The French were now banking on European efforts to provide enriched 
uranium, but demanded that products be tailored specifically to their needs.40 In 
the previous year, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin had already offered uranium 
enrichment services on more favorable terms.41 In March 1973, the West Ger-
man energy supplier RWE and the Euratom Supply Agency spoke with Mos-
cow about purchasing “basic equipment” in the form of enrichment services for 
a power plant to be built in Mühlheim. Talks proceeded “to everyone’s utter 
satisfaction,” and subsequent contract negotiations about uranium for the nu-
clear power plants in Biblis and Neckarwestheim followed that same year.42 
According to one comment, the ministries in charge – i.e., the Federal Ministry 
of Economics and Technology and the Federal Ministry of Education and Re-
search – had “long been in support of unconditional trade regarding the en-
richment of uranium in the Soviet Union.”43 Although initially doubtful, the 
Foreign Office also concurred, since such an arrangement would boost trade with 
the Soviet Union, and since the United States had given its consent and were 
negotiating uranium deals. In addition, Brezhnev offered to build a nuclear power 
station in Kaliningrad, which would supply electricity to West Berlin and the 
Federal Republic.44 Also, the GDR adopted techniques from the West and 
                                                             
37  Draft dept. 403 19.12.1972, in PA AA ZA 13924 and Chancellery to AA 29.1.1973, in ibid. 
38  Comp. Judt 2013, 62-5. 
39  Note BMWi C 1 4.11.1981, in PAAA ZA 132521. 
40  On France's unwillingness to cooperate, the Federal Republic, and nuclear energy cf. now: 
Tauer 2012. 
41  Documentation Hermes 23.3.1971, in PA AA 105299. 
42  Documentation Randermann 10.5.1973, in ADAP 1973, vol. 2, 653-8 and documentation 
Poensgen 24.8.1973, in ibid., 1282-3. 
43  “[S]eit langem für eine vorbehaltslose Genehmigung auch weiterer Geschäfte der Uranan-
reicherung in der Sowjetunion” and documentation Poensgen 24.8.1973, in ADAP 1973, vol. 
2, 1282-3. 
44  Stent 2001, 227. 
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planned closer cooperation on nuclear power plants with West Germany. In 1987 
GDR officials discussed importing a power plant from its Western neighbor, but 
they failed to actually do so. However, they did order technical support for the 
East German power plant in Lubmin from the West German company Siemens.45  
One may argue that these findings support the counterfactual conclusion that 
energy trade between the East and the West would have flourished even if the 
oil crisis of 1973 had never taken place. Because of their geographical and 
cultural proximity, companies were in favor of developing this relationship in 
spite of political resistance. One must not underestimate the twofold historical 
experiences shared by many company managers in this context. First, busi-
nessmen such as Berthold Beitz were familiar with Eastern European energy 
trade because they worked in the region prior to 1945. Second, they saw them-
selves as post-war pioneers of a new Entente Cordiale. At the same time, many 
Arab countries were considered problematic business partners before 1973. The 
impact of the brief Arab oil embargo during the June War of 1967 must not be 
underrated; although aimed at the United States and Great Britain, the embargo 
also affected Western Europe, which received part of its oil supplies from 
American companies. Albeit comparatively insignificant on an economic level, 
this event gave cause for alienation and prompted the West to safeguard its 
energy supply on a broader scale prior to the fateful year of 1973.46  
3.  Failed Plans for Cooperation Post-1973 
The 1973 oil crisis consolidated existing plans to cooperate with the USSR. 
While OPEC’s rising prices doubtlessly made Soviet resources appear more 
attractive, waning trust in the Arabs further bolstered the Soviet Union’s repu-
tation as a reliable trading partner. I would like to argue, however, that the 
overall picture regarding cooperative efforts after 1973 reveals that, while a 
number of large-scale plans were devised, many of them were never realized. 
This failure was due to both economic and political causes. Hence, the year 
1973 was not the death knell of utopian ideas; on the contrary, contemporane-
ous energy policies allowed them to fully flower.  
Such visionary schemes involved a variety of energy resources. In 1974, the 
Soviets expanded their nuclear energy portfolio, proposing that four nuclear 
power plants be built in West Germany to supply the country and West Berlin 
with electricity. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had few political concerns about 
cooperating with the USSR and Poland at the time. By the same token, the 
                                                             
45  Müller 2011, 72-5. Cooperations since 1989 are mentioned in: Högselius 2005, 16, 38. 
46  Regarding its political effect on West Germany cf. e.g.: 83. Kabinettssitzung, 13.6.1967, 
<http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0100/k/k1967k/kap1_2/kap2_24/para3_1.html> 
and 159. Sitzung 12.3.1969, in Kabinettsprotokolle 1969 (München, 2012), 134. 
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Federal Republic agreed to the construction of nuclear power stations in des-
potic states, such as Brazil and Iran. Only the GDR’s potential interference cast 
doubt on plans to install a power supply line.47 The project fell through in 1976, 
however. The West German parties involved had not been able to find a solu-
tion as to how electricity could traverse GDR territory without compromising 
safety. Regardless, the GDR had protested vehemently against connecting 
Berlin and West Germany in such a way,48 and although the United States had 
initially agreed to a “non-paper,” their eventual opposition had boiled down to 
the possibility of blackmail.49 Officially stating that the project was not lucra-
tive enough, the Soviet Union was equally responsible for the aborted plans.50 
Unexpected offers from Poland and the GDR, both of which were looking to 
supply West Berlin and West Germany with electricity from nuclear power 
stations built on their home turf, took a similar course.51 One endeavor that 
came to fruition, however, was the provision of materials to Soviet power 
plants.52 From these examples we can deduce that, by means of countertrade, 
the socialist states were eager to supply West Germany with electricity so as to 
gain access to high-tech facilities. The sense of urgency with which they pur-
sued potential opportunities to provide for West Berlin in particular may be 
construed as a political concession. However, it equally signifies a potential 
means to exert pressure in conflict situations by securing a strategic advantage.  
While West Germany’s gas business was expanding, other projects follow-
ing the oil crisis also failed. In the mid-1970s, for instance, upon recalculating 
the costs for the gigantic pipeline to Japan, the Soviets abandoned negotiations. 
Instead, they offered to build a railroad as a supply route. Although Japan suf-
fered a particularly heavy blow during the 1973 oil crisis due to its scarcity of 
natural resources, the USSR chose not to resume negotiations.53  
                                                             
47  Intergovernmental talk between Germany and the USSR 29.10.1974, in ADAP 1974, vol. 2., 
1369-70 and Honecker an Schmidt 10.9.1974, in Bonn und Ostberlin 1969-1982: Dialog auf 
höchster Ebene und vertrauliche Kanäle. Darstellungen und Dokumente, ed. Heinrich Potthoff, 
310, (Bonn: Dietz, 1997), and talk Schmidt-Gierek 11.6.1976, in ADAP 1976, vol. 1, 861. 
48  This event and the corresponding argument are mentioned in Pittamn 1992, 68. 
49  On exploratory talks see: Schmidt an Kissinger 18.10.1974, in ADAP 1974, vol. 2, 1303 and 
on the “non-paper” see: Aufzeichnung Hölscher 12.9.1975, in ADAP 1975, vol. 2, 1247-1248. 
U.S. concerns about security are mentioned in Wörmann 1986, 85. 
50  Talk between Genscher and Olszowski 6.4.1976, in ADAP 1976, vol. 1, 465.  
51  The embassy in Moscow to the AA 26.2.1974, in PAAA B 41 51 and documentation dept. 421 
6.9.1974, in ADAP 1974, vol. 2, 721 and talk Genscher-Olszowski 6.4.1976, in ADAP 1976, vol. 
1, 465, note 7 and Honecker to Schmidt 10.9.1974, in Potthoff, Bonn und Ostberlin, 310. 
52  In 1980, it is reported that: “Die Deutsche Babcock hat den nuklearen Teil für 3 KKW 
geliefert” [The Deutsche Babcock has delivered nuclear material for 3 power plants] and 
notes for discussion for meeting between Chancellor Schmidt and First Deputy Premier 
Tikhonov of the Soviet Union, 28.5.1980, in AdSD 1/HSAA008907.  
53  Overall, the relationship cooled. Cf. Tōgō 2010, 242. 
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Similarly, a deal between the Soviet Union and the United States referred to 
as “North Star” was called off in late 1974. Plans had been made for a pipeline 
to Murmansk, from which gas would be delivered to the United States via 
waterway. Talks ended partly because of the American policy intended to facil-
itate emigration procedures for Soviet Jews, among other things. West German 
plans to pipe gas from Iran also turned out to be no more than a pipe dream. 
The supply line was intended to run through Turkey, but in 1974 the Soviets 
suggested an alternative that was more cost-effective and designed to traverse 
their own territory.54 This was another example of the USSR’s demanding 
nature as a trading partner, which tended to impede initial negotiations.55 None-
theless, the two partners reached an agreement in 1975 which stipulated that 
the pipeline would cover 11 billion cubic meters per annum – although, only 
half was bound for the Federal Republic; the other half would be shared be-
tween Austria and France. The project was doomed to failure, however. The 
1979 Iranian Revolution drove the final nail into its coffin.56 Oil supplies were 
also a pressing problem. Anticipated large-scale projects, such as the oil pipeline 
to Kassel, could not be put into action, because Soviet authorities were reluctant 
to support them. Even though the demand for oil was high in the West, it was 
insufficiently met – so insufficiently, in fact, that West Germany’s supplies 
dropped even before 1973. As a principal customer, the German energy company 
VEBA was aiming to double oil supplies,57 but the quota of 4.4 million tons 
could “not be reached” in 1973, “despite the rigorous insistence that had marked 
Germany’s agenda over the last few years.”58 To compensate for this dearth, the 
USSR considered making additional oil available from third party countries that 
were unable to offer their services to Western states because their oil production 
plants had been nationalized. For political and legal reasons, however, in early 
1973 West Germany refused to consent to such terms.59  
So, we can conclude that the first oil crisis intensified negotiations with the 
USSR, but its chief effect was the expansion of projects that had already been 
underway before its inception. There are various reasons for this. Against the 
backdrop of détente, the oil crisis made the Soviet Union a significant trading 
partner, causing it to be more rigid – but also more erratic – in its various nego-
tiations. Its growing economy nurtured not only a desire for Western technolo-
gy but also the audacious belief that long-term projects with the West were 
indeed possible. Concomitantly, this boost resulted in a greater demand for 
energy in the Comecon states, which, save for Romania, all depended to a large 
                                                             
54  The embassy in Moscow to AA 26.2.1974, in Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA) B 136/17572. 
55  Embassador Wieck/Moskow to AA 11.6.1974, in ADAP 1974, vol. 1, 708. 
56  Cf. Hogselius 2013, 173 and Wörmann 1986, 84. 
57  Benningsen-Foerder/executive chairman of VEBA to Foreign Minister Scheel 7.1.1974, 
Benningsen-Foerder to Hermes/AA 7.5.1973 6.2.1973, in PAAA B 41 51.  
58  Note dept. 403 prior to Brezhnev's 11.5.1973, in PA AA B 41 51. 
59  Benningsen-Foerder to Hermes/AA 7.5.1973 and note dept. III D 2 6.2.1973, in PA AA B 41 51. 
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degree on exports from the USSR. The Soviet Union now faced the predica-
ment of either refraining from imposing price rises and, thereby, securing its 
energy supply to its socialist brother nations (as agreed to in the Five-Year Plans), 
or choosing to benefit from high world market prices but thus creating economic 
difficulties for the Comecon states. In a sense, the Soviets tried to have it both 
ways. They gave priority to Comecon, supplying its member states with low-
price energy; but at the same time, they breached contract and gradually began to 
raise energy prices after 1974. Not only did this double-edged energy policy 
increase tensions in the East, it also encumbered negotiations with the West. In 
the end, the lowering of oil prices post-1975 impeded the same activism that not 
long before had galvanized plans for cooperation between the East and West.  
Hence, the fascination surrounding oil pipelines between Eastern and West-
ern Europe should not lead us to dismiss the limitations that marked joint ener-
gy trade deals in the 1970s. Furthermore, new supply lines were also installed 
within Western borders shortly before the oil crisis, facilitating the expansion 
of natural gas and fostering cooperation among member states of the European 
Community. This rings true for the “Trans Europa Naturgas Pipeline” (TENP) 
in particular, which was built between Switzerland and the Netherlands in 1972 
and put into operation two years later, providing Germany with Dutch gas. 
While imports from the East had increased by the end of the decade, the por-
tion of the overall energy supply they constituted remained small. Only eleven 
percent of primary energy imports were purchased from the Comecon states – 
more precisely, by the late 1970s, 15 percent of Western Europe’s natural gas, 
a mere two percent of its oil, and four percent of its imported coal came from 
the East.60 The actual bargain from these deals was significant, but perhaps 
more important was the symbolic meaning of this energy diplomacy. These 
deals promised even closer cooperation in the future.  
4.  Despite Political Crises: Reorientation after the Crisis 
of 1979 
It is well known that Iran’s cessation of oil supplies in 1979, which amounted 
to about ten percent of the world market, led to a second major price increase. 
Since Iran was its chief supplier, West Germany was hit particularly hard and 
had to look to other countries for imports.61 Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
the United States, who were also bulk buyers, also felt the squeeze financially. 
While the economic consequences of the worldwide oil crisis of 1979 are at 
least as far-reaching as those of 1973, the earlier crisis still overshadows the 
                                                             
60  Data taken from: Referat 405 AA 30.1.1980, in PA AA ZA 126878. 
61  Note to Chancellor 15.1.1979, in BA/K B 136 16650. 
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later one. Most historical accounts in Western Europe in particular have hardly 
heeded it. This may lie in the fact that numerous concurrent crises made 1979 
seem like an annus mirabilis. Among these are the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan, the NATO Double-Track Decision, the Iranian Revolution and Iran hos-
tage crisis, the revolution in Nicaragua, the United Kingdom’s Winter of Dis-
content and the subsequent election of Thatcher, and the accident at the Three 
Mile Island atomic reactor near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in the United States.62 
Since the Soviet Union was accused of invading Afghanistan in order to extend 
its influence on the oil-rich regions of the Persian Gulf, the Cold War became 
even more closely linked with the struggle for energy resources.  
All of these seemingly circumstantial events influenced potential reactions 
to the second oil crisis. The 1973 boycott could still be seen as merely a disrup-
tive incident; the Iranian Revolution and the rise of Islamism, on the other 
hand, made clear that tensions between the Arab world and the West would 
make the reliability of stable oil supplies and of allies, such as Iran, impossible.  
The expansion of atomic energy was still seen as an alternative solution in 
1973. By 1979, the Three Mile Island accident near Harrisburg had increased 
the number of skeptical voices in many countries. And while, in 1973, vision-
ary collaborations with Eastern Europe held the promise of a solution, after the 
Afghanistan campaign, cooperation with the Soviet Union became much more 
problematic. In addition, the perception of the Soviet Union’s energy policy 
changed. At the beginning of the 1970s, the USSR was considered a market of 
the future. Now, analyses – mainly American – predicted major energy prob-
lems as the USSR’s raw materials were being depleted and the demand for 
energy only grew.63 These assessments, which were erroneous according to 
current points of view, were meant to keep the Western allies from cooperating 
further with the Soviet Union. German politicians and experts were less pessimis-
tic about the decline of Soviet oil and gas, but they anticipated supplies west of 
the Urals would lessen and antiquated extraction technology would make tapping 
into Siberian resources difficult.64 Accordingly, they foresaw currency issues, 
should the Soviet nations be forced to purchase in the global market. 
Around 1970, East-West cooperation in the energy sector had prepared an 
accompanied political rapprochement. Now, energy diplomacy served as a 
connecting point in the political and economic crisis. The second oil crisis 
exacerbated problems in both blocs, but also ensured widespread cooperation. 
While the Soviet Union was still in a period of growth, which the first oil crisis 
had not slowed, by 1980 the balance of its ninth Five-Year Plan was devastat-
                                                             
62  On how these changes were interconnected, see Bösch 2012. With a biographical perspec-
tive on five countries, Caryl 2013.  
63  For details on these predictions, made particularly by the CIA, cf. documentation 21.3.1980, 
in PA AA ZA 132518. 
64  Cf. Notes dept. 405 AA 21.3.1980, in PA AAZA 126878. 
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ing and growth stagnated.65 Specifically, rising energy costs forced the socialist 
countries to make overtures to the West for selling and refining raw materials, 
and for managing debts accrued from higher energy costs.66 
As already mentioned, the Federal Republic nevertheless continued to bank 
on expanding cooperation with the Soviet Union in the energy market. This 
initially applied to atomic energy, which Chancellor Helmut Schmidt clearly 
supported, despite growing protests from within his own party. The records 
show that in numerous discussions with politicians from the Soviet Union, 
developing countries, and industrialized countries, Schmidt emphatically pro-
moted the building of atomic energy reactors and even frequently offered to 
export German nuclear power plants.67 In exchange, the Soviet Union presented 
new deals in 1980, renewing its offer to export electricity to the Federal Repub-
lic, Italy, and Austria on a long-term basis if the West would provide the power 
plants.68 In fact, cooperation with the Soviet Union on atomic energy contin-
ued: the Soviets provided enriched uranium to the Federal Republic, France, 
and Italy, and Western European firms supplied nuclear reactor components to 
the Soviets.69 In support of this deal, the CEO of Deutsche Babcock AG, a 
German manufacturing company that played an important role in this endeavor, 
said, “Trade between both peoples is planned for the long term and should be 
independent of the vagaries of politics.”70 At the same time and with the sup-
port of the German federal government, Babcock continued work on the power 
plant it was building in Iran, despite the revolution, hostage crisis, and sanc-
tions.71 The Federal Republic also attempted to bypass American sanctions 
against Iran, but ultimately agreed to the sanction out of loyalty to the transat-
lantic alliance. In fact, businessmen were seen as political negotiators – and 
they probably saw themselves as such. Hence, the Soviet Embassy called not 
the West German Embassy, but the chairman of Krupp, Berthold Beitz, to say 
that 10,000 troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan and, therefore, the NOC 
and IOC should reconsider their boycott of the Olympic Games.72  
The expansion of energy diplomacy manifested itself most clearly in the So-
viet Union’s provision of natural gas. Around 1980, natural gas was considered 
                                                             
65  Hildermeier 1998, 883. 
66  On the negative effects of the energy crisis on the Comecon states, cf. Danos 1988, 53-60. 
67 Cf. e.g. note on talk between Schmidt and President Moi/Kenai 12.2.1980, in AdSD 
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71  Schmidt to Ewaldsen, 4.6.1980 (draft), in BA/K B 136 30561. 
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the energy of the future, and it was believed there were significantly more 
reserves. Despite the invasion of Afghanistan, the crisis in Poland, and the 
American embargo policy, the Federal Republic attempted to continue contract 
negotiations for the biggest natural gas deal to date. The same was true of 
France, Italy, and Austria. The plan was to double Soviet gas imports to the 
Federal Republic – natural gas would thus constitute 30 percent of West Ger-
many’s total energy consumption – while gas imports from the Netherlands 
were to decrease in the future.73 In addition, after laborious political negotia-
tions, a gas pipeline to West Berlin was negotiated, with compliance from the 
GDR once the Soviet Union had given its consent.74 On November 20, 1981, 
after difficult negotiations about prices and credit, Ruhrgas AG and the 
Sojusgasexport, the Soviet foreign trade company for natural gas, successfully 
closed a deal.75 In the same vein, German companies outside the energy indus-
try closed large deals with Moscow at the beginning of the 1980s, such as the 
construction of airports and steel mills – projects that the public criticized.76 
Several studies and internal documents have already demonstrated that the 
deal between West Germany and the Soviet Union led to diplomatic tension 
with the United States, especially after Ronald Reagan took office in 1981.77 
America stubbornly tried to keep its Western allies, especially the Federal 
Republic, from going through with the deal. They warned that Germany would 
become dependent on and be pressured by the Soviet Union, and that the Fed-
eral Republic would be “Finlandized.” For this reason, the United States de-
manded that the Germans give them a detailed plan of what would happen if 
the Soviets were to cut the gas supply.78 On top of this, President Reagan asked 
the Germans to postpone concluding the contract until the United States had 
developed an alternative program to the Siberian energy supplies.79 In fact, in 
the autumn of 1981, the United States presented some proposals, which includ-
ed the expansion of American coal refining and the development of American 
reactor technology in Western Europe.80 Clearly, it was not only questions of 
security that played a role; the Americans were also attempting to secure their 
own energy exports. At the end of 1981, after martial law had been declared in 
Poland, Reagan announced more unilateral economic measures against the 
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USSR, such as “mandatory licensing of exports from oil and gas facilities,” 
which also applied to American oil drill components and pipe-laying machin-
ery.81 
The Federal Republic made various attempts to temper American objections. 
It stressed that Soviet gas had deliberately been limited to 30 percent and that 
the Soviet Union thus supplied them only about six percent of primary energy 
exports. In reality, the proportion was somewhat higher, if including the en-
riched uranium for atomic energy. An important argument was that natural gas 
was supplied not only to the Federal Republic, but also to several neighboring 
countries, and therefore it was not possible to target only the Federal Republic 
with sanctions. Economic considerations made sanctioning several countries 
extremely unlikely. Moreover, government representatives pointed out that 
they tripled the West German underground gas reservoir and that the European 
gas networks were flexible enough to compensate a fallout of the Soviet gas 
supply.82 In 1980/81, the Federal Republic also made clear that the Soviet 
Union was a much more reliable partner than Algeria, which supplied gas 
mainly to France, but aspired to build a pipeline to the Federal Republic.83 
There were no other alternatives, they argued. Iran was out of the picture, and 
Norway was interesting only in the long run. Leading German politicians were 
convinced that this type of long-term cooperation would be able to prevent 
future wars and that the development of Siberia would keep the Soviet Union 
away from the Persian Gulf.84 The most important argument for adhering to the 
contracts was probably the promotion of West German exports to the Soviet 
Union, which played a crucial role for this country. The contracts enabled 
currency exchange and confidence building for future trade with the Soviet 
Union in general.85 Notably missing is an argument that seems obvious in ret-
rospect: the use of natural gas was more environmentally friendly than Ameri-
can coal from and atomic power.  
Internally, future dependence on Soviet energy was indeed seen as problem-
atic. However, only the Soviet invasion of Poland could cause the contracts to 
break down.86 The United States had no more success with Germany’s neigh-
bors, such as France. The French president Mitterand informed Reagan that he 
would make a deal with the United States if they would supply gas at the same 
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price as the Russians.87 France also believed that the 30 percent limit on gas from 
the Soviet Union was acceptable. Ultimately, the deal with Western Europe suc-
ceeded, but with significantly lower supplies than had been expected. Instead of 
the projected 40 billion cubic meters per year, 30 billion per year would be sup-
plied to Western Europe, one-third of which went to the Federal Republic.88  
This East-West deal with the Soviet Union did not just cloud relationships 
among NATO partners; the disgruntlement it triggered within the Warsaw Pact 
had perhaps more serious consequences. Since the Soviet Union had increased 
its sales to the West after the 1979 oil crisis, it reduced its cheap long-term 
supply to its sister states. In 1982, the contractual amounts were reduced by 10 
percent, with exemptions for only Poland and Cuba due to their political situa-
tions.89 This reduction was fatal to the socialist countries’ economies and en-
dangered their political status. The SED viewed it as “the beginning of the end 
of Soviet global strategy,” and Honecker supposedly questioned Brezhnev as to 
why he “wanted to risk the existence of the GDR because of two million tons 
of petroleum,”90 since, even for relatively wealthy Socialist countries such as 
the GDR, it had far-reaching consequences. On the one hand, the natural gas 
supply reduction led to a huge increase in brown-coal mining as a substitute. 
On the other hand, the decision seriously aggravated the GDR’s financial status 
after 1979 and helped lead to its reliance on the Federal Republic for billions of 
Deutschmarks in loans. Similarly, the attempt to increase energy production in 
the GDR led to major problems in the 1980s. Accidents increased, and the 
hoped-for savings on raw materials failed.91 As had happened with the Soviet 
Union, the second oil crisis encouraged interdependencies between the two 
parts of Germany. Thus, in 1979 the two Germanies negotiated new means of 
cooperation. For example, the GDR wanted to sell more coal and crude oil and 
in return purchase more gas oil.92 Also, the FRG Ministry of Economics had 
confidential talks with the GDR Ministry for Foreign Trade about building a 
brown coal plant in the GDR, which was to be financed by the electricity it 
would supply to the Federal Republic.93  
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Thus, one could conclude that the second oil crisis gave new impetus to 
East-West cooperation and destabilized socialist countries. The collapse of oil 
prices in the mid-1980s in particular brought the Soviet Union new problems. 
But, above all, energy diplomacy achieved new importance: in spite of the 
political crisis, it crossed the Iron Curtain.  
5.  Conclusion: Energy Diplomacy as “a Marathon into the 
21st Century” 
It has frequently been noted that the energy crises accelerated and manifested 
processes of globalization, particularly with regard to industrialized Western 
countries and their interdependencies with Arab and Latin American oil-
producing countries. As the energy market shifted into higher gear in the 
1970s, the Soviet Union emerged as an important trading partner, who desired 
close relations with industrialized Western countries. While this desire was 
rooted in economics, forming such relations was without exception politically 
relevant and depended upon political support. 
From this perspective, the oil crisis of 1973 was not a crucial turning point. 
Rather, energy diplomacy between the East and the West entered a dynamic 
phase as early as the late 1960s, with numerous cooperative projects initiated 
before the 1973 crisis. We can assume that the Soviet Union’s booming econ-
omy and the short oil embargo during the June War of 1967 played significant 
roles in the context of these developments. The fact that political tensions be-
tween the blocs were beginning to ease is certainly an important point. At the 
same time, however, energy diplomacy was a precondition – a catalyzer for 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik frequently referenced since 1970.  
The 1973 oil crisis galvanized East-West cooperation and was the cause for 
numerous grandiose plans intended to connect the two sides through their indi-
vidual energy transport systems. Far from being restricted to the famous gas 
pipeline installed in the Federal Republic, these systems also involved nuclear 
energy and oil supplies. Significantly, however, while cooperative schemes 
initiated before the oil crisis were pursued further, collaborations that arose 
under détente in particular and, more precisely, during the time at which the 
CSCE was negotiating the Helsinki Accords failed. This failure was due to the 
Soviet Union’s erratic, yet confident demeanor and the grandeur with which 
they invested in these plans.  
When, in 1981, negotiations regarding the natural gas industry entered the 
home stretch despite continuing political crises, West German Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher remarked to his Soviet colleague Andrei Gromyko, 
“We are not short-distance sprinters. This is a marathon into the twenty-first 
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century.”94 In terms of both time and space, energy diplomacy set a course for 
long-term developments from the late 1960s onwards. Time frames thus shifted 
during the seventies. On the one hand, resource constraints elicited a feeling of 
limitedness, which was closely connected with the Soviet Union’s resource pow-
er and increased during the energy crisis. On the other hand, large-scale projects 
necessitated that trading partners consider long-term effects. In particular, the 
pipeline, as well as joint plans to build nuclear power plants, presupposed dec-
ades of cooperative thinking, implying mutual trust in a stable and long-lasting 
relationship. In some respects, however, while creating a climate of long-lasting 
optimism, these large-scale investments also deprived both sides of alternatives.  
The invasion of Afghanistan was for these positive approaches. Yet, from 
our present perspective, the documents reveal how well-calculated and with 
what persistence matters of cooperative energy and economic policy with the 
Soviet Union and the Comecon states were pursued even in the early 1980s. 
The second oil crisis and the pipelines that were concurrently built, especially, 
must have made it seem as though there was no alternative to cooperation. In 
this context, energy diplomacy was pivotal for maintaining, and even develop-
ing, forms of cooperation in the face of political differences.  
In spite of the many changes in the energy sector, these cooperative energy 
programs not only continue to exist, but have also expanded. Russia remains the 
world’s biggest producer of oil and natural gas, and its wealth and power depend 
to a large extent on these resources. However, public criticism of Gazprom’s 
market power has become stronger.95 The Soviet Union hardly used their position 
of power in their trade with Western nations, because it did not want to endanger 
its most important export market. However, its Eastern European neighbors, such 
as Ukraine, are still suffering under their dependency on Russian energy.  
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